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SURVIVING EU ACCESSION: THE SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY 
EFFECTIVE SHIPBUILDERS 
Summary 
The Croatian shipbuilding industry is busy with record orderbooks. It is true to say, 
however, that the only constant in life is change and significant changes are facing the 
industry in the near future. Not least of these will be Croatia’s accession to the EU. 
Elimination of subsidies and increasing prosperity will inevitably lead to an imperative to 
improve performance. This paper reviews the changes that may occur and identifies the key 
tactics that have been used by shipyards in high cost EU countries to cope with life without 
subsidy and their high cost base. 
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Introduction 
The current shipbuilding boom has brought with it record orderbooks and record 
shipbuilding prices, with both more than doubling over the past five years. The market is not 
without its problems, however, in particular due to the rising cost of raw materials and in 
particular the cost of steel plate, which in Europe can now exceed $1,000 per tonne. Not very 
long ago the rule of thumb price was around $350 per tonne. These difficulties have affected 
shipbuilders globally although, notwithstanding this, it is possible to say that shipbuilding has 
seen improved profitability in recent years. Some commercial shipbuilders are now able to 
report profit to sales ratios in double figures for the first time in many years. 
 Where the market will proceed next is impossible to predict. The current boom (or 
“super-cycle” as it is now regularly termed by commentators) is outside any previous 
experience. Problems include the global “credit squeeze”, restricting the amount of capital 
available for building ships and developing shipyards, high energy and raw material prices, 
the threat of a slowdown in economic growth and the looming spectre of overcapacity. 
Certainly the rate of generation of new orders has slowed significantly in 2008 and the 
orderbook, for the moment at least, appears to have peaked.  
Croatian yards have managed to take advantage of the boom, at least in terms of the 
amount of work won. Whilst order volume has increased, however, the industry remains 
subsidised. Croatia is now alone in Europe, and possibly the world, in openly providing direct 
contract subsidies to shipbuilding. This is of concern because the implication is that the 
Croatian industry has (mostly) been unable to achieve profitability even at the peak of the 
market. 
Irrespective of what happens in the market, the situation in Croatia is about to become 
more complex with accession to the EU. This event alone brings with it an imperative for the 
industry in Croatia to change and improve if it is to survive.  
1. Shipbuilding in Europe 
It is true to say that when measured by tonnage, European shipbuilding is now a long 
way behind the Far East in terms of market share and, as a general comment, EU shipbuilders 
have not been able to take advantage of booming market conditions in terms of the volume of 
ships on order. However, this does not mean that the industry in the Europe is dead. When 
measured by value, rather than volume, the European shipbuilding industry ranked first in the 
global market until recently and still represents a substantial and thriving sector of great 
importance to the economy of the region. The following table presents CESA’s estimate of 
the value of completed ships in different regions up to 2005. 
 
Table 1 Value of tonnage completed (€million, source: CESA) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Japan 11,257 10,274 9,317 9,766 9,589 
South Korea 9,424 10,103 9,433 9,595 11,683 
China - 2,563 3,188 4,970 5,063 
CESA 12,197 13,090 14,328 10,463 9,041 
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The implications of this are that Europe retains a significant shipbuilding industry 
despite having a high cost base in many countries and despite the phasing out of subsidies that 
were so essential through the 1980s and 1990s. This does not mean to say that everything in 
the garden is rosy, as demonstrated by the financial difficulties of some Danish, Polish and 
Spanish shipyards at the time of writing this paper and the break-up of the Aker group 
following disappointing results. The strong Euro and very high steel prices are causing 
problems for many: however, a reasonably robust industry survives within the EU despite the 
high cost base. 
2. Accession to the EU 
Accession to the European Union will bring with it a number of significant changes. 
Many of these are positive, such as access to markets and economic developments. Some will 
present challenges. Chief amongst these may be:  
- Skilled labour migration within the EU typically from lower cost to higher cost 
countries;  
- Strengthening currency and increasing labour costs; 
- Elimination of subsidies. 
 
 The effects of the first of these should be minimised by agreements called 
“transitional arrangements” whereby existing member states restrict the migration of low cost 
labour from a new member for up to seven years. It is hoped that the use of such arrangements 
will minimise the damage to the Croatian labour market on accession. The second will present 
more difficult issues but the most difficult of all is likely to be the third: the elimination of 
subsidies. 
 Direct subsidies to shipbuilding within the EU have now ceased following the end of 
the series of shipbuilding directives and the so-called “Temporary Defensive Mechanism” 
(TDM)1. The autumn 2006 “State Aid Scoreboard” [1] report indicated that the amount of 
state aid to shipbuilding in EU countries fell from an average of €832 million per annum for 
the period 2001 to 2003 to €342 million per annum for the period 2004 to 2006. In 2006 an 
estimated €213 million was granted to the shipbuilding sector. The effects of the TDM are 
still being seen in aid figures but these should decrease further as this is eliminated from the 
orderbook by the end of this year.  
 
Under the prevailing EU framework on state aid to shipbuilding [2], member states are 
able to grant limited subsidies for research, development and innovation2. This provision 
provides the greatest benefit to those building more sophisticated ship types, which will 
inherently include a greater degree of innovation. According to the EU’s information 
resources [3] the following schemes for assistance (“Innovation Aid”) have been granted 
approval so far. 
 
- In February 2005 the EU approved state aid to German shipbuilders worth up to €27 
million over four years, 
 
                                                 
1 The granting of direct operating subsidies to shipbuilding ceased to legal within EU countries on 
December 31st 2003. The provision was temporarily extended for orders for a limited range of ship 
types up to 31st March 2005, however, whilst the EU pursued a grievance against the South Korean 
shipbuilding industry in the WTO, accusing South Korea of suppressing prices of container ships, LNG 
tankers and chemical/oil products tankers. This provision was referred to as the “Temporary Defensive 
Mechanism”. 
2 Other subsidies are permissible in specific circumstances, for example relating to closure aid. 
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- In March 2005 the EU approved state aid to French shipbuilders worth up to €25 
million per year for six years. 
 
- In March 2005 the EU approved aid to Spanish shipbuilders worth up to €20 million 
for two years. 
 
- In 2006 the EU approved aid to Dutch shipbuilders worth up to €20 million per 
annum for three years. 
 
- In April 2007 the EU approved aid to Italian shipbuilders worth up to €30 million 
per year for three years, ending on 31st December 2009. 
 
These amounts are what the EU has approved as a maximum for individual 
governments to provide to their shipyards, if justified. No aid from the EU is implied. In 
November 2007, CESA indicated that 120 applications had been made within these approved 
schemes, of which 56, worth a total of around €70 million, have been approved by the 
national authority granting the aid. As a rough guide the amount of subsidy available could be 
worth up to around 2.5% on a sophisticated innovative ship although it would be zero for non-
innovative ship types. By and large those that have applied for approval for innovation aid, 
which favours and promotes innovative products (as part of the LeaderShip 2015 strategy 
[4]), are higher cost countries. 
3. How have high cost EU shipyards survived without significant subsidy? (The seven 
habits of highly effective shipbuilders) 
One short answer to this question is that many haven’t. Over the past ten years the 
number of active major shipyards in Europe has reduced from about 200 to about 1253. Those 
that have been unable to adapt to the new regime in shipbuilding have closed. Those that have 
tried to find more “creative” ways around the problem may not have fared much better. The 
current problems of the bankrupt Polish shipbuilding industry should serve as a warning that 
the EU does not tolerate breaches of the rules. The EU is seeking to force the industry in 
Poland to repay €1.6 billion in illegal state aid, along with permanent closure of uneconomic 
capacity, as it has in the past achieved in Spain and the UK. 
 Many have survived, however, even though labour costs in Europe can be extremely 
high. An estimate of comparative costs in 2007 is given in the following table.  
 
Table 2 Estimated average hourly labour costs in shipbuilding in Europe (source: First Marine International) 
 
 2007 estimate 
($ per hour) 
2007 estimate 
(€ per hour) Level 
Norway 43.62 30.53 
France 41.08 28.76 
Denmark 41.06 28.74 
Germany 39.63 27.74 
High 
Spain 32.21 22.55 
Netherlands 30.97 21.68 
Finland 30.25 21.17 
Italy 27.57 19.30 
Mid 
Croatia 8.48 5.93 
Poland 7.04 4.93 Low 
                                                 
3 Based on a count of shipyards reporting deliveries in Lloyd’s Register. 
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It can be seen that labour costs in Europe are divided into three bands: high at around 
€30 per hour, mid-level at around €20 per hour and low at around €5 per hour. 
 The means by which very high labour cost builders can remain competitive, even 
without subsidy, can be summed up under the heading “the seven habits of highly effective 
shipbuilders”4. These are as follows5: 
 
1. Investment  
2. Performance 
3. Use of best practice 
4. Continuous improvement 
5. Market focus 
6. Consolidation 
7. Strategy 
 
Although subsidy does not figure in the list this is not to say that it has not been an 
important element in the strategic development of the industry in Europe in the recent past 
(the Temporary Defensive Mechanism being a good example) but it has to be used as a short 
term strategic tool. Long term reliance on subsidy undoubtedly has a detrimental effect on the 
development of shipyards, shielding them from the imperative to improve. Note also that low 
labour costs do not appear in this list either. Whilst offering some potential competitive 
advantage, low labour costs can also act in a similar way to long term subsidies, shielding the 
shipyard (temporarily) from the imperative to reform. Reforms are needed in advance of cost 
increases, not after they have happened. 
 Each of the seven “habits” is discussed briefly below. 
Investment 
In a recent analysis undertaken by First Marine6 into the ways that higher cost 
shipyards in Europe differentiate themselves, investment was not mentioned, nor was 
performance or continuous improvement. The reason for this is that these are not really 
differentiating factors. In other words it goes without saying that yards will be engaged in 
these activities. Those that are not will probably no longer exist. 
 Investment in research and development is at the core of CESA’s strategy 
“LeaderShip 2015”. CESA has estimated that investment in R&D in Europe averages around 
10% of sales. In addition to this, investment is needed in facilities, technology, training and 
other areas. Essentially, shipbuilding is no longer the low/mid technology business that it was 
in the 1980s. Successful shipyards are now technologically advanced enterprises with 
facilities, technology and personnel to match. Investment is an essential part of achieving this 
status.  
Performance 
As indicated above, this is also a “given” rather than a differentiating factor. How 
good does performance have to be? In short, good enough to ensure profitability. Whilst this 
is an apparently obvious statement, the implications are far reaching in terms of setting targets 
for a business. The important point is that targets should be set by looking outwards from the 
                                                 
4 Paraphrased from “The seven habits of highly effective people” by Stephen R. Covey, published by 
Simon and Schuster (1992). 
5 No hierarchy or relative importance is implied in the order of this list, which is random. 
6 Not in the public domain 
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business to see what the market and economics demand, rather than focusing inwardly to 
answer the question “what do we feel we are capable of”? The only reliable way of setting 
targets is through benchmarking against others and against the market. In less successful 
shipyards, performance targets are often set on the basis of incremental improvement from the 
current position. For example the target could be to “improve steelwork productivity 
(manhours per tonne) by 5% per annum”. Without reference to external factors it is 
impossible to say whether this is enough or not enough. Experience has shown, however, that 
targets set internally in this way will almost inevitably a) not be enough to achieve 
competitiveness and b) not reflect what the business is actually capable of. As a very simple 
rule of thumb, if the shipyard is not progressing towards its profitability goals then the targets 
are not high enough. 
 Additionally it must be remembered that competitiveness is an economic issue rather 
than simply a matter of production man-hours. The cost per unit of output can be lowered not 
only by reducing the number of direct man-hours used but also by reducing the overhead 
burden imposed by the organisation. Performance improvement must take the full economic 
equation into account. All too often targets concentrate on steel production, based on 
manhours per tonne, ignoring overhead burden and outfit work content.  
Use of best practise 
There is a strong correlation between the level of use of best practice and performance. 
This is demonstrated in the following figure, based on First Marine International’s proprietary 
benchmarking system. 
 
Fig. 1 Performance benchmarking targets (source: First Marine International) 
 
The figure plots performance on the vertical axis, using man-hours spent per 
compensated gross ton produced, and a rating indicating the level of use of best practise on 
the horizontal axis. Roughly speaking a best practice rating of 1 represents the technology of 
the 1960s and 5 represents state-of-the-art. To be competitive a shipyard should lie 
somewhere close to the benchmark lines plotted on the chart. Movement in the vertical 
6 
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direction implies a better use of the technology already available in the shipyard whilst a 
horizontal movement implies an increase in the level of use of best practice and is likely to 
require capital investment. 
 The best practice rating takes into account all processes and practices in the shipyard 
and competitive yards tend to have a reasonable balance across all aspects of the process 
Improving a single area, for example installing a panel line, will only improve certain aspects 
of the process and alone will have a limited effect on the overall performance of the company. 
Crucially, it is as important to develop the “software” sides of the process as much as the 
“hardware” and it will be a hallmark of effective high cost shipbuilders that the soft processes, 
for example planning and material control, will be highly developed. 
Continuous improvement 
This is another “given” and recognises that no amount of improvement can ever be 
enough to constitute a permanent guarantee of competitiveness. As costs increase so 
productivity has to improve just to stand still. Performance improvement therefore has to be a 
permanent quest. The job is never finished and must become part of every day routine. 
As an illustration of what can be achieved the following figure presents an estimate of 
the development of productivity of the South Korean shipbuilding industry in the period 1990 
to 2004. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Estimated productivity development in South Korean shipbuilding (source Marine International) 
 
Performance is represented by the factor “man-hours per CGT”, taking into account all 
man-hours used in shipbuilding, not only direct production hours – again, bearing in mind that 
performance relates to the entire organisation, not only direct workers. The trend indicates a 
long term average improvement of around 7% per annum, although this varies significantly 
over time and by shipyard. In the early stages of performance improvement, more significant 
increases can be obtained as the “big-ticket” items relating to investment and performance 
improvement are tackled. South Korean yards have continued to improve and it is estimated 
that the large yards can now achieve a performance below 15 man-hours per CGT.  
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Market focus 
The days when shipyards could build any ship required by any customer are gone and 
for sound economic reasons shipyards have to tailor their facilities and organisation to 
targeted products. This can have a profound implication on the economics of the business. 
The major yards in South Korea, for example, have in the past targeted primarily high volume 
relatively simple ship types, producing output measured in hundreds of standard ships per 
annum. This requires huge investment in facilities and also demands a high market share to 
ensure the economies of scale needed to recover the cost of those facilities. In Europe, the 
highest cost builders tend to build passenger ships, which, partly by avoiding competition 
with Far East builders, attract relatively high revenue per unit of output. This is demonstrated 
in the following table showing the average revenue achieved per CGT produced in the period 
2002 to 2006 and the main product focus of the country concerned.  
 
Table 3 Estimated average revenue per CGT achieved 2002 to 2006 and main product focus (source: 
First Marine International) 
 
 Average revenue(€ per CGT) Main product focus 
Finland 3,642 
France 3,443 
Italy 3,158 
Passenger 
Germany 2,593 Passenger / Container 
Denmark 1,764 
Poland 1,477 
Romania 1,428 
Container 
Croatia 1,306 Tanker / dry cargo 
 
A strong correlation is seen between the products and the value achieved per unit of 
output (CGT). It should be noted that with the exception of Denmark, all high labour cost 
countries are engaged in passenger ship building. At least at the moment this means that 
competition with Far East shipyards can be largely avoided by many and this explains why 
the purchase of a significant share of Aker by Korean builder STX has caused so much 
concern in the European shipbuilding community. Shipyards engaged in the volume sectors 
that are the main product focus of Far East competitors, in particular container ships and 
tankers, are likely to find competitive conditions tougher. 
Consolidation 
About 40% of the output from European shipyards in the period 2002 to 2006 was 
produced by group companies and consolidation has been something of a “hot topic” in 
European shipbuilding. Having said this, consolidation for its own sake is unlikely to confer 
any significant benefit, as can be seen in the failure of the Spanish state-owned Izar group and 
the failed groupings of state-owned yards in Poland. Consolidation has to be strategically 
thought through and has to be seen in the context of “value engineering”. How does the 
consolidation confer an economic advantage on the business? Put another way, consolidation 
is easy but consolidation with significant economic benefit has proven to be more difficult. 
 Gaining economy of scale, as has been achieved in South Korea, is perhaps the most 
important benefit that could be pursued but this is not the only reason to establish groups of 
shipyards. Partnering with shipyards in lower cost countries to reduce the overall unit cost of 
production could also confer a significant economic benefit and has been used by many 
shipbuilders in Europe. The extent of the benefit depends on the nature of the partnership and, 
in particular, the way in which the subsidiary is managed. It is relatively easy to overmanage 
8 
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the lower cost subsidiary and by doing so eliminate much of the economic advantage being 
pursued. 
The largest consolidation in Europe has been the Aker Group, which, at the time of 
writing this paper, is in process of being dismantled. It is not yet clear how far the process of 
consolidation actually benefited the group and for the moment, therefore, the benefits of 
consolidation may, to some degree, be under question. 
Strategy 
Whatever tools a shipyard decides to use, its development must be directed according 
to a coherent strategy. Shipbuilding has to work with a relatively long time horizon. Without a 
strategy it is not possible to effectively direct investment, performance improvement and 
research and development. Whilst committing to a specific strategy involves risk, because it 
will inevitably reduce flexibility, not committing to a strategy really amounts to gambling. 
It is not only a strategy for the individual company that is important. CESA has 
worked to lobby the EU for support for the strategy set out in “LeaderShip 2015”, to help to 
provide the economic framework needed for the development of the industry. This strategy is 
centered on a commitment to develop an industry in Europe that is focused on innovative and 
technologically advanced ships, rather than the standard off-the-peg products that can 
inevitably be purchased more cheaply from Far East market leaders. 
4.  Conclusions and implications for the industry in Croatia 
The shipbuilding industry in Croatia is facing a watershed period related to 
privatization and accession to the EU. In the face of the changes that will result, doing nothing 
is not an option; nor is doing more of the same, given the current financial position of most of 
the industry. To use a cliché, it is revolution that is needed rather than evolution. The industry 
in Croatia must change and adapt to the market and economic forces it is facing: those forces 
will not adapt to support the industry’s internal aims. What is it that the industry in Croatia is 
proposing to do that wasn’t previously done by former state-owned UK, Spanish and Polish 
shipbuilders, which largely failed to adapt? 
Croatian shipbuilders may do well to study the strategies and tactics used by higher 
cost EU shipbuilders to chart a course for the future. If so the course will inevitably involve 
investment and performance improvement. It may also involve rationalisation and 
consolidation to develop a sustainable industry. To be successful the course must also be 
charted using way points derived from benchmarking and market economics and not from 
internal examination. 
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